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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTS IN
CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN

C

OURT decisions of the past two decades reveal interesting applications
of tort doctrines in suits involving aircraft manufacturer's liability
for construction defects. While subjecting aircraft manufacturers to strict
liability on a warranty theory has never been seriously considered,1 the
courts have achieved a somewhat similar result in using negligence doctrines. An analysis of these decisions indicates that the aircraft manufacturer has great difficulty in avoiding liability for damages resulting from
such defects. This conclusion was reached upon an examination of the
defenses available to an allegedly negligent manufacturer; the standard of
care imposed on a manufacturer for design and construction of airplanes;
and questions of causation and burden of proof.
The recent case of Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin2 affords an
opportunity to observe the effectiveness of the assumption of risk and
contributory negligence defenses to the manufacturer. In this case, the
airline sued the manufacturer for alleged negligence in the design of a
wing splice which broke during flight because of metal fatigue. The court
refused to hold the manufacturer liable as a matter of law, but its defenses
proved to be so inadequate that the effect of the decision was tantamount
to the same result. Martin alleged as affirmative defenses, that Northwest
in making an inspection of the plane (1) assumed a risk of a defect in
design, or (2) was contributorily negligent in not discovering the defect,
and (3) that Northwest was contributorily negligent in failing to equip
the plane with radar.
With respect to the issue of assumption of risk, the record reveals that
Northwest had every opportunity to know of and appreciate the danger
of the defect,8 which, as a matter of fact, one of its own independent expert

witnesses had established as
in assumption of risk cases
applied, and that a plaintiff
prehend a risk which should
court held that it was error

being "open and obvious." It is evident that
an objective standard of knowledge must be
cannot be heard to say that he did not comhave been obvious to him. 4 Nevertheless, the
to submit the assumption of risk question to

1 Since there is no contract between the manufacturer and the passenger,
most courts would refuse to apply a warranty theory in actions between these
parties because of the apparent lack of privity. Those cases which do not require
privity of contract are usually confined to actions arising from the purchase of
defective food. Prosser, Torts §84 (2d ed. 1955). See also Trans World Airlines

v. Curtiss-Wright, 2 CCH Avi. (4th ed.) 17849 (N.Y.S. Ct., Dec. 1, 1955). The
warranty theory may not be available even in manufacturer-airline litigation,
where there is a contractual relationship, if the action for breach of warranty
was excluded by the purchase agreement as in Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L.
Martin, 224 F. 2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 24 U.S.L. Week 3184 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 1956) (No. 538).
2Supra, note 1. This case is significant in that it is apparently the first

aircraft manufacturer negligence case to reach an appellate court on an issue

of substantive law.
3 Northwest maintained a staff of engineers, inspectors, and other personnel
at the Martin plant who studied and approved the design of every part of the
plane before it was accepted. Upon completion, the Northwest staff reported to
their office that the plane was "the most extensively tested plane in commercial
aviation history."
4 Prosser, Torts §55 (2d ed. 1955).
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the jury, reasoning by inference that Northwest could not have known of
the risk of danger. 5 Perhaps the underlying basis for the inadequacy of the
assumption of risk defense in a negligence action against the manufacturer
for defective construction is that it is almost inconceivable that an airline
would operate a plane, which it must be taken to know was in danger of
crashing because of so obvious a structural defect. Consequently, it would
seem that since the court in the Northwest case did not give the question
of assumption of risk to the jury, where such action would have been substantiated by the most favorable facts, the aircraft manufacturer cannot
rely on this defense in the future with any degree of confidence.
In dealing with the defense of contributory negligence based on the
failure to discover the defectively designed wing splice, two basic questions
are present: Does the airline have a duty to inspect planes which it purchases? And if not, does an inspection by an airline obligate it to use
due care?
In the Northwest case, the manufacturer conceded and the court stated
that if the airline had not made any inspection of the plane at all, there
would be no issue of contributory negligence. But this decision seems to
6
be in conflict with De Vito v. United Airlines, where the airline was held
responsible to the passenger for not discovering an error in the manufacturer's instructions on the precautions necessary to meet the dangers of
carbon dioxide gas used in fire extinguishers. However, this apparent
divergency can be explained by the fact that while the airline owes the
7
passenger a duty of inspection, it owes the manufacturer no such duty.
And, even though the airline fails to inspect, and is adjudged guilty of
sceondary negligence as to the passenger, it may recover such losses from
8
Consequently, the
a manufacturer who has been primarily negligent.
manufacturer cannot successfully impose a contributory negligence defense
merely because the airline failed to make an inspection which may have
uncovered the °manufacturing error.,
There remains the question of whether an airline is obligated to use
care if it undertakes to make an inspection. The court, in the Northwest
case, reasoned that since the fact that inspections were made in no way
increased the risk of harm, the airline should not be penalized for attempt5 The court arrived at this conclusion from the following language (p. 126):
The evidence that Northwest's representatives did insist upon changes
whenever they saw any reason to be dissatisfied leads to the conclusion,
at least by negative implication, that they saw no reason to criticize the
wing joint. They had no reason whatever not to object to anything they
might regard as hazardous, and, in fact had been expressly instructed
by Northwest to insist on any changes they thought would increase the
safety of the airplanes ... There is no evidence that the danger lurking
in the wing joint was so obvious to Northwest representatives who actually did observe it that they must be taken to appreciate that danger.
(The emphasis is the Court's.)
6 1951 U.S. Av. R. 181, 98 F. Supp. 88 (1951). The pilot followed the
erroneous instructions of the manufacturer and was overcome by carbon dioxide
gas entering the cockpit, thereby causing the plane to crash.
7In the De Vito case, the passenger sued the airline who made a motion to
cross claim liability onto the manufacturer. In that the passenger was a party
to the suit, the airline was held to the duty of a carrier, which made it responsible for all but latent defects. Whereas, in the Northwest case, the airline settled
the passenger's claims, and sued the manufacturer for its losses. The airline
was held to the duty of a purchaser which does not require an inspection.
8Lewis v. United Airlines, 1941 U.S. Av. R. 245, 29 F. Supp. 112 (1939).
American Airways v. Ford Motor Co., 1939 U.S. Av. R. 149, 1 Avi. 809, 17 N.Y.S.
2d 998, aff'd, 284 N.Y. 807, 31 N.E. 2d 925 (1935). Also, an airline can recover
its losses caused by the negligence of a manufacturer regardless of the fact that
in an action by a passenger injured in the accident "that same dereliction would
not be a defense to it."
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ing in its own interest to conform to a higher standard of care than that
imposed on it by law. But the logical implication is that even a careless
'inspection would free the airline from liability. Such an inference seems to
be contrary to the well known tort concept concerning affirmative conduct,9
which provides that even in the absence of a duty, if a person attempts to
aid another, and "takes control of the situation," he is regarded as entering
voluntarily into a relation of responsibility, and hence as assuming a duty.
Thereafter, he will be held for any failure to use reasonable care. However,
since the affirmative conduct theory is usually utilized to construct a duty
on behalf of a careless defendant, it is at best only analogous where applied
to a contributory negligence situation. Also, it may be effectively argued
that the airline did not take sufficient "control of the situation" to bring the
affirmative conduct theory into play.10 In any event, the court in the
Northwest case made no attempt to reconcile its decision with this well
established tort theory, and it seems safe to say that an airline will not be
deemed contributorily negligent if it fails to discover a structural defect
in making an inspection.
There have been recent developments in aviation safety where radar
is used to prevent any encounter with thunderstorms. The manufacturer
alleged that the plaintiff-carrier was contributorily negligent in not having
this safety equipment. The court held that it was error to give this question
to the jury, because it felt that feasible airborne radar was not then commercially available, even though the airline did not assign this as a reason
in explaining why it was not installed. A look at the evidence introduced
by the manufacturer on the issue of the commercial availability of radar
seems to warrant a jury question." However, such action may be construed
as indicative of a judicial tendency to resolve tenuous questions of fact
against the manufacturer for reasons of public policy which will be discussed later.
In the field of aviation as of 1938 certificates of airworthiness are2
required before a plane can be used for interstate commercial purposes.'
At first blush it would appear that these certificates could be used as an
absolute defense by a manufacturer when charged with negligent design
or construction, but the contrary seems to be the result reached. Two questions should be considered in relation to certificates of airworthiness: Can
such a certificate be successfully introduced into evidence? And if so, will
it serve as a complete defense in a negligence action?
In Maynard v. Stinson,13 the manufacturer attempted to introduce a
certificate of airworthiness in rebuttal to an allegation of negligent design,
9 Prosser, Torts §38 (2d ed. 1955).
10 The realities of the situation in the Northwest case support this conclusion. The evidence showed that the Martin 202 was an assembly of 75,000 parts.
There were over five hundred Martin designing engineers on the project, and
over 17,000 separate drawings were made. Over 2,000,000 man hours were
expended on the design of the plane. By contrast Northwest never had more
than three inspectors present at the Martin plant and only one aeronautical engineer.
11 The record reveals that (a) Northwest's pilots had flown aircraft equipped
with two types of radar; (b) the equipment which was then available had been
tested by Northwest; (c) Northwest's communication's engineer conceded that
radar equipment which was available at the time the plane crashed would have
been of assistance; (d) Northwest's superintendent of meteorology, speaking as
of the time of the crash, confessed that radar would be of assistance in circumventing a thunderstorm area; (e) One of the reasons Northwest decided not to
install radar was that it was effective only 95% of the time.
12 52 Stat. 917 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401-611 (1952).
Is 1940 U.S. Av. R. 71, 1 Avi. 698 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich. 1937).
Recovery was based on the negligent design of the plane's carburetor and exhaust
pipes which caused a fire.
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but the court refused to receive it in evidence on the ground that the
manufacturer had failed to adduce testimony from employees of the Department of Commerce as to the nature and extent of their examination. 14 The
manufacturer could not produce the necessary witnesses because the counsel for the Secretary of Commerce refused to allow employees of the Department to testify,15 and the individual who actually made the inspection could
not be found. Consequently, it is not an easy matter to get these certificates
into evidence because of the difficulty in producing corroborating testimony,
but even when admitted, they do not constitute a complete defense to an
allegation of negligence. In one such case, 16 the certificate was allowed, but
only as some evidence of the qualifications of the operator and the machine,
while in another it was held that air carriers cannot rely on government
inspections as a complete fulfillment of their duty of care. 17 It may be
concluded then that both the common law defenses of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence, and the certificate of airworthiness are of
dubious value to an allegedly negligent aircraft manufacturer attempting
to avoid liability.
For obvious reasons, it was necessary to assume the aircraft manufacturer's negligence while considering the inadequacy of its defenses, and
an inquiry into the duty of care required of a manufacturer in the design
and construction of aircraft does not appear to rebutt this assumption.
That an aircraft manufacturer has a duty to use care has never been
doubted,' 8 but the crucial question is to the extent of that duty. The court
in the Maynard case spoke of the manufacturer as only being responsible
for those defects in its plane which an ordinary degree of care could have
prevented. But "ordinary degree of care" is a legal term of art which
requires translation into a comprehendible standard. The Maynard case
defines the limits of both the knowledge and precautions required of the
aircraft manufacturer, by holding the manufacturer accountable only for
the knowledge and skill possessed by an airplane designer in the year in
which the plane in dispute was designed. This has the effect of protecting
the manufacturer from the admission of hindsight evidence on the issue
of ordinary care. 19 Also, the court held the manufacturer answerable for
taking those precautions which are commensurate with the damages which
14 The ruling accords with the hearsay evidence rule since the testimony of
the parties making out and granting the certificate was theoretically available.
15 An interesting question is whether the Department of Commerce would
be liable for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946. Henry G.
Hotchkiss, in Airoraft Manufacturer's Liability and the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1988, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 469 (1948), suggests that there is little doubt
but that the granting or withholding of certificates of airworthiness calls for
so high a degree of technical skill and, more important, technical judgment as
to leave no doubt that it is a discretionary function, and not a ministerial one,
thereby continuing the Government's immunity from a tort suit. See also Dale-

hite v. United States, 846 U.S. 15 (1953).
.16 Bolineaux v. City of Knoxville, 1937 U.S. Av. R. 145, 20 Tenn. App. 404,
99 S.W. 2d 557 (1935).
17 Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, 1944 U.S. Av. R. 50, 321 Ill. App. 340,
53 N.E. 2d 131 (1944).
Is Sellers v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 1929 U.S. Av. R. 61, 1 Avi. 126, 150
Miss. 473, 116 So. 883 (1928). This was perhaps the first case on the subject
and was resolved on an issue of fact; demonstrating by inference that even at

that early date the question of law was not deemed worthy of discussion by the
court.
19 This was acknowledged in the Northwest case when the court refused to
permit the airline to use evidence of the modifications in the wing joint, made by
the manufacturer after the damage was discovered, to show what the manufacturer should have done in the first place.
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will likely result, if they are not taken. 20 Since the magnitude of possible
harm in plane accidents is so serious, 21 it does not seem unreasonable to
hold the manufacturer responsible for taking almost all possible known
safeguards. Consequently, it may be deduced from the Maynard case that
the care required of an aircraft manufacturer compels it to take any
precaution which could have averted the defect responsible for the accident
in question, unless such precaution was unknown to those ordinarily skilled
in designing and constructing airplanes at the time.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur22 has been useless in proving the
alleged negligence of the manufacturer: first, because of a lack of expert
knowledge concerning aviation hazards, and second, because of the absence
of "exclusive control" in the manufacturer at the time of the crash. However, more recent decisions in passenger-airline litigation have held that
the flight safety record now established justifies the conclusion that negli28
The "exclusive
gence is the most likely explanation when a plane crashes.
control" requirement has also been limited so that the manufacturer no
longer need have actual control over the product at the time of the accident. 24 Consequently, future application of res ipsa loquitur to cases of
negligence in the design and construction of aircraft would come as no
great surprise.
Insofar as the defect responsible for the accident may not have been the
result of faulty production, there is the question of who has the burden of
proving whether the defective condition was caused by the manufacturer's
negligence. This issue arose in McCoy v. Stinson,25 a Canadian case, where
there was some question as to whether a wing fitting broke as a result of
improper welding by the repairman-defendant or for some other unknown
reason. The court held that where the plane has been in use over a period
of months, damage could happen which the manufacturer could not possibly
prove in court, and consequently could not be held responsible for proving.
The owner of the plane was held answerable for showing that the condition
In the language of the court (p. 72)
"Ordinary care in cases where the result of a slip will be slight and
unimportant is not sufficient care to fill the requirements of ordinary care
where the result of a failure to exercise it will be dangerous or destructive of human life."
21 Prosser, Torts §84 (2d ed. 1955). Ordinary care is not considered solely
in light of the magnitude of possible harm, but also in view of the probability of
defects, the cost of effective inspection, and the customs of the business. However, magnitude of possible harm seems to be the determining factor in aircraft
manufacturer cases.
22
Res ipsa loquitur enables a plaintiff to present his case to the jury without
specific allegations of negligence. The conditions usually stated as necessary
for the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur are three: (1) the accident
must be of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agent or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Prosser, Torts §42 (2d ed.
1955).
28 United States v. Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951); Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951). See McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Airline-PassengerLitigation, 37 Va. L. Rev. 55 (1951).
24 There is now quite general agreement that the fact that the plaintiff is
sitting on the defendant's stool when it collapses, or has possession of an exploding bottle, or a loaf of bread with glass baked inside of it, or is using an
appliance, which the defendant has manufactured, will not prevent the application of res ipsa loquitur. Some courts have said that it is enough that the defendant was in "exclusive control" at the time of the indicated negligence. Prosser,
Torts §42 (2d ed. 1955).
Defendant welded
25 1940 U.S. Av. R. 84, 1 Avi. 698, Ontario Supp. (1938).
a gusset onto a wing fitting of the plaintiff's plane which was found broken upon
an examination of the wreckage.
20
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which resulted in the crash could not have been introduced between the
delivery of the plane and the accident. However, this is of little consequence
in many cases, especially those involving improper design, where the defect
is of such a nature that it can be easily traced back to the manufacturer. 26
Many of the cases discussed in this article seem to be of such a technical nature that a jury will not always be capable of rendering a fair and
considered judgment of the evidence. When one bears in mind the extent
of damage to the plane and the difficulty of determining the causes of the
aircraft crashes through examination of the wreckage, plus the possibility
of fatigue and overstressing, etc., it is not difficult to conclude that such
matters are beyond the realm of knowledge and experience of the average
juror. A contemporary Canadian case declared that those cases involving
the weighing and consideration of scientific evidence fall into the category
which "is better tried by a judge alone, than by a judge with a jury." 27
However, the elimination of the right to trial by jury in ordinary civil
actions in this country can come only by way of statute.28 Consequently,
the aircraft manufacturer's liability hinges on the ability of twelve untrained minds, depending at best on conflicting expert testimony, to decide
questions of fact involving technical and complex concepts of aeronautical
engineering. This is unfortunate, but a factor which the manufacturer
cannot overcome.
It appears then that the courts, in disposing of aircraft manufacturer
negligence cases with common law tort doctrines, are placing the brunt
of the loss resulting from structural defects on the manufacturer. However, this seems to be a satisfactory solution in that it is identical with
the conclusion arrived at when the same problem is approached from the
viewpoint of public policy.
It is clear that the court, in the Northwest case, acted in the public
interest in not allowing the manufacturer to base its common law defenses
on the airline's inspection program. The purpose of the inspection was to
aid in the production of safer commercial aircraft. Even though the accident was not averted in this case, such a program is undoubtedly beneficial
in the aircraft industry as well as the public. But, if Northwest had been
found guilty of assumption of risk in making the inspection, or of contributory negligence in not discovering the defect, then, more than likely,
that would have spelled the finish of the inspection program. Thus it would
seem highly improbable that any airline would risk liability by making an
inspection which is beyond its legal duty.
But the Northwest case is not alone, for it seems that the public interest
is being served whenever the aircraft manufacturer is found liable for
losses resulting from manufacturing defects. This conclusion can best be
explained on the grounds that the manufacturer is in the best position
to prevent structural defects and distribute the loss.
26 The defects in the three leading cases were obviously of a manufacturing
origin and there was no question of cause. In the Maynard case, the carburetor
and exhaust pipes were too short; there was an error in the instructions on how
to use fire extinguishers in the De Vito case; and, in the Northwest case, the
wing splice was improperly designed.
27 Nystedt v. Wings, Ltd., 1940 U.S. Av. R. 151, 1 Avi. 1036, 51 M.R. 63
(1940). The plaintiff was desirous of a trial by jury since a previous trial,
Galer v.Wings, Ltd., 1938 U.S. Av. R. 177, 1 Avi. 778, 47 M.R. 281 (1938), by
another passenger and arising out of the same accident, resulted in an adverse
determination by a judge sitting without a jury. The facts of the case are briefly
as follows: The accident occurred when the propeller blade sheared off near the
hub. The judge felt that the failure was due to faulty design, but that the flaw
was not known to those skilled in the science and art of designing planes at the
time.
28
Note, 16 J. Air L. & Com. 240 (1949).
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The passenger obviously can neither prevent nor distribute the loss, but
can only bear it alone, or refrain from air travel. The airline has the
means to distribute the loss to the passengers, but is not in a good position
to prevent it. Only the manufacturer can prevent its own errors by being
more careful. But such care need not impede the making of changes and
improvements which would benefit commercial aviation, for the manufacturer can distribute a reasonable share of the loss to the consumer in the
form of increased prices. However, no manufacturer can afford to allow'
this loss to vastly exceed that incurred by a competitor. Therefore, a rather
close balance should be achieved in that a manufacturer must be careful,
but is not so restricted that it cannot risk technological advancements.
Thus it would appear that a manufacturer of commercial aircraft is
held strictly liable for damages caused by defects in structure or design,
for this result is achieved regardless of whether common law tort doctrines
are applied or whether the decision rests on public policy considerations.

